The ongoing civil war in Sudan is exacerbating existing tensions within the fragile administration of Chadian President Mahamat Déby. His late father, Idriss Déby, had a significant role in the earlier war in Sudan’s Darfur region, a conflict that spilled over into Chad.
Mahamat Déby, who rose to power controversially after his father’s death in battle three years ago, claims to maintain a neutral stance in Sudan’s conflict. However, his government has inadvertently bolstered the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group, by allowing them to transport fuel, weapons, and stolen goods through Chad and evacuate wounded fighters. Additionally, Déby’s administration has either permitted or ignored the RSF’s recruitment efforts in Chad, particularly targeting the country’s Arab minority.
These policies have strained relations within Déby’s government, especially among factions with tribal connections to Sudanese groups opposing the RSF, such as the Joint Force of Armed Struggle Movements (JSAMF), led by Minni Arko Minawi and allied with the Sudanese army.
The outflow of fighters from Chad into Sudan has raised alarms in Déby’s government. Reports indicate that the Chadian army has implemented measures to monitor and restrict cross-border movements of its soldiers into Darfur. Speculation has also emerged within Chadian opposition media that army commanders, including General Ousmane Bahr Itno, a cousin of the president, may be supporting the Joint Force in Darfur.
As the situation in Darfur worsens, it threatens to deepen divisions within the Chadian military and security services due to competing loyalties and differing policy priorities. Recently, the Joint Force has deployed additional troops into the Jebel Moon area of West Darfur and engaged in clashes with RSF forces in North Darfur. They claim to have taken control of the strategic ‘Triangle’ border area intersecting Chad, Sudan, and Libya, as well as outposts along the desert road between Northern State and Darfur.
Sudan is home to a significant population of refugees, many of whom have fled RSF attacks, potentially providing recruitment opportunities for groups seeking to challenge the RSF in Darfur.
In a significant move, President Déby returned from a visit to the United Arab Emirates—the main international backer of the RSF—where he announced the removal of his Minister of Public Security and Immigration, Mahamat Charfadine Margui. He replaced Margui with General Ali Ahmat Aghabache, the deputy chief of the army and a Chadian Arab with ties to the historic Chadian Arab rebel movement, the Democratic Revolutionary Council (CDR).
Aghabache’s appointment has been welcomed by Chadian RSF supporters on social media, and he emphasized the use of Arabic in his new role during a recent ceremony. As Minister of Security and Immigration, he holds the authority to oversee border activities, although the extensive 1,400-kilometer (870-mile) Chad-Sudan border poses significant challenges to enforcement.
Aghabache’s background as an Arabic speaker with familial connections to the RSF may position him as a crucial intermediary between Déby’s government and the powerful paramilitary, which dominates much of the Chad-Sudan border and large parts of Sudan. His political career began after his CDR rebel group signed a peace deal with the Chadian regime in 2007 and has included various diplomatic and administrative roles.
Aghabache succeeds Margui, who had been in office since February 2023 and had less connection to the border region.
The current conflict in Sudan has historical roots, stemming from the former Darfur war (2003-2020), which involved the same factions but with different alliances. That conflict saw the Sudanese army and allied Janjaweed militias clashing with Sudanese rebel groups that were sometimes supported by Chad.
In 2013, the Janjaweed were reorganized into the RSF and gained prominence after the ousting of President Omar al-Bashir in 2019, when RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo became deputy chairman of a transitional military council. The RSF’s rebellion against the military in 2023 sparked the ongoing war, while former Darfur rebel groups, initially neutral, aligned with the army earlier this year.
Chad’s historical involvement in Sudan’s conflicts has led to attempts by the Khartoum government to destabilize the Chadian regime, including a rebel assault on the capital N’Djamena in 2006.