The influence of the United States and its internal affairs consistently resonates across the world, especially in regions of heightened tension. Some even argue that the U.S. itself has been a catalyst for such conflicts, pointing to the crises in the Middle East, China-Taiwan, Ukraine, and across Africa.
Here, we explore how Trump’s election might shape the Horn and East African regions—areas already grappling with challenges such as insurgency, humanitarian crises from extended droughts, and state-building efforts that have drawn a range of actors with competing interests. We’ll examine these effects on a country-by-country basis, highlighting both the positive and negative dimensions of U.S. interests in the region and the broader implications for stability.
The United States has always had ties with Somalia, but military intervention began in the early 1990s during its mission in Mogadishu. Although it withdrew shortly after, U.S. influence remained. By 2007, America re-entered the Somali scene with a stated mission to counter armed factions in the country. Since then, Somalia has served as a critical front in America’s global “War on Terror,” with the U.S. launching operations from its Africom base in Djibouti, targeting militant groups within Somalia and beyond.
America’s “counter-terrorism” operations in East Africa have been closely tied to Ethiopia, led by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who ruled from 1995 to 2012. Cooperation between the United States and Zenawi formally began in 2002, and Zenawi, alongside then-Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi, was welcomed to the White House. This was the first time two African heads of state were jointly received at the White House, underscoring America’s reliance on Ethiopia and Kenya as regional allies in the fight against terrorism. The 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, which killed over 200 people, further reinforced America’s counter-terrorism focus in East Africa. These attacks were attributed to Al-Qaeda and were allegedly led by Fazul Abdullah Mohamed, a Comorian militant who was later killed in Somalia in 2011. Known as one of Al-Qaeda’s primary figures in East Africa, Mohamed had a $5 million bounty on his head. His role in the embassy bombings intensified America’s long-term commitment to combating militants threats in the region.
However, Trump’s stance on Africa during his first term showed a stark departure from previous administrations. He openly dismissed the strategic value of Africa, referring to several nations as “shithole countries,” and imposed travel restrictions on citizens from various African states, including Tanzania, Sudan, Somalia, Chad, Eritrea, and Nigeria. Trump famously neglected Africa during his term, never visiting the continent. Separately, he labeled Somalia a “failed state” due to its internal challenges.
This approach resulted in reduced U.S. funding for African programs and support that past administrations had sustained. Trump’s scaled-back presence left space for other global powers, like China, Russia, Turkey, and India, to assert their influence. Turkey, in particular, has significantly expanded its role in Africa without a history of colonialism, focusing on state-building and humanitarian efforts, particularly in Somalia. This new strategy has earned Turkey substantial goodwill and presence across the continent.
China also views Trump’s presidency as an opportunity, seeing it as a chance to deepen its economic footprint through ambitious lending initiatives. Beijing’s expanding influence might see further growth, particularly if U.S. interests continue to wane.
In Sudan, where Trump’s administration could impact ongoing peace processes, the situation could stagnate if the administration is less engaged, potentially allowing regional actors to dictate the balance of power. This also applies to South Sudan, where the peace process, with significant U.S. involvement, could face delays. If America withdraws further from regional conflicts, it opens the door for local actors to maneuver, potentially affecting stability.
Another critical area is the fight against Alshabab in Somalia and neighboring countries. Trump’s administration previously withdrew a significant number of American troops from Somalia, about 700 soldiers reportedly, reducing the ground support that Somali and regional forces relied on. If this trend continues, Turkey could find itself filling the gap, deploying drone support to assist Somali forces. Yet, a full U.S. retreat may embolden Alshabab and other militant groups, potentially posing a threat to Somalia’s nascent government.
Trump’s hands-off approach to Ethiopia’s internal affairs may also influence its ongoing conflicts, such as those involving the TPLF and the federal government, as well as unrest in regions like Tigray and Amhara. Ethiopia’s recent accession to BRICS and the Western distancing from Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed during the Tigray conflict have shifted the dynamics in the region. This has led to a shift in proxy conflicts, moving from Ethiopia to Kenya, where President William Ruto recently became the first African leader in many years to be welcomed at the White House—a gesture perceived by many as carrying a message of support.
In Tanzania, political tension has been evident. The Tanzanian government criticized the Biden administration’s stance, accusing the U.S. of interfering in its internal affairs, while the Biden administration had accused Tanzania of detaining and suppressing its opposition.
Lastly, Kenya has taken on a more prominent role in U.S. regional strategy, particularly after Ruto’s White House visit. CIA officials have visited Kenya recently, underscoring its importance to U.S. stability efforts in East Africa. This renewed attention on Kenya could shift regional dynamics, especially as Kenya takes on security responsibilities previously held by Ethiopia.
In sum, the implications of Trump’s presidency on East and Horn of Africa remain complex and far-reaching. While his policies might reduce direct U.S. involvement, other powers, such as China, Russia, and Turkey, are likely to capitalize on the vacuum, reshaping the region’s landscape with new alliances and strategies that could redefine the future of East Africa and beyond.
